Economic Conversion, Productive Efficiency and Social Welfare by Dumas, Lloyd J.
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 4
Issue 8 November Article 29
March 1977
Economic Conversion, Productive Efficiency and
Social Welfare
Lloyd J. Dumas
Columbia University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Social Welfare Commons, and the Social Work Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Social Work at
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact
maira.bundza@wmich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dumas, Lloyd J. (1977) "Economic Conversion, Productive Efficiency and Social Welfare," The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare:
Vol. 4 : Iss. 8 , Article 29.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol4/iss8/29
ECONOMIC CONVERSION, PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY
AND SOCIAL WELFARE
Lloyd J. Dumas, Associate Professor, Columbia University
Introduction
Traditional economic theory holds that there is a tradeoff be-
tween inflation and unemployment, and that accordingly price
stability (i.e. 0% inflation) can only be achieved at the expense
of increased unemployment, while jull employment (corresponding to
an unemployment rate of about 3%)' requires acceptance of an ongoing
inflation. In 1960, the noted economists Paul Samuelson and Robert
Solow published an analysis of annual data for the per d 1933-1958,
from which they quantitatively estimated this tradeoff. It was
their rough estimate that the elimination of inflation would require
acceptance of a 5%-6% rate of unemployment while the achievement of
full employment would impose a continuing 4%-5% rate of inflation.
In a later study Lawrence Klein and Ronald Bodkin looked at quarter-
ly data from 1946-57 and concluded that an unemployment rate of 6.9%
would have to be maintained In order to achiev price stability,
thus implying a slightly more severe tradeoff.3
The fact is that over the last several years, inflation and un-
employment have both been persistently near, and often substantially
beyond, these high tradeoff limits simultaneously. During the cal-
endar year 1975, the U.S. national unemployment rate was averaging
8.5% at the same time the consumer price index was rising by 6.5%.4
Something had clearly changed in the U.S. economy to produce this
unprecedented high inflation/high unemployment situation. The
question is what?
An important part of the answer lies not in the events of the
last few years by themselves but rather is rooted in a much longer
process of cumulative economic deterioration stretching over the
past few decades. Furthermore, this process does not derive from a
fatal flaw in the workings of the U.S. economic system. It is
neither necessary nor inevitable. Rather it Is the unintended re-
sult of a conscious decision, with broad popular support, to adhere
to a system of national priorities which has given primacy to the
development and maintenance of a sector which is particularly un-
productive from a purely economic viewpoint -- the military. When
the U.S., for the first time in its history, entered into a pro-
tracted era of high military spending following the close of the
Second World War, it sowed the seeds of the economic decline whose
bitter harvest it is just beginning to reap.
-567-
The initial section of this analysis traces the mechanism by
which the persistence of high military spending has played a major
role in producing the economic deterioration underlying the present
U.S. recession/inflation, and highlights the implications of this
deterioration for social welfare. The second section deals with the
nature of the serious economic and political barriers that have
developed to the reversal of this economic and social decline.
Finally, we consider the kinds of policies which should be effective
in overcoming these barriers and accomplishing the transition from
military to civilian orientation which is a necessary pre-condition
of a serious and successful effort to improve the economic and social
welfare of the people of the United States. Some of the plethora of
conceivable productive uses of the resources freed from the military
are discussed.
The Economic Effects of Military Spending
The idea that persistently high defense spending could play a
major role in producing economic decline flies in the face of one of
the most deeply ingrained and widely held economic beliefs: that a
capitalist economic system benefits from (or at the very least is not
harmed by) high levels of military expenditure. From the far left to
the far right, there seems to be consensus on this one point. But
the fact that a belief is deeply ingrained and widely held does not
make it true.
Interestingly enough, Adam Smith, regarded as the father of
rough and tumble laissez faire capitalism, did not share this view.
On the contrary, Smith apparently saw military spending as econom-
ically parasitic, writing in his epic The Wealth of Nations (pub-
lished in 1776):
0...the whole army and navy are unproductive labourers...
Such people, as they themselves produce nothing, are all main-
tained by the produce of other men's labour. When multiplied
...unproductive hands, who should be maintained by a part only
of the spare revenue of the people, may consume so great a
share of their whole revenue, and therefore...encroach...upon
the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour,
that all the frugality and good conduct of individuals may not
be able to compensate the waste and degradation of produce
occasioned by this violent and forced encroachment.05
There are essentially four reasons why the maintenance of high
levels of military expenditure in the U.S. over the past thirty years
has produced both inflation and unemployment. These are: (1) the
economic nature of military goods; (2) the way in which military pro-
curement has been conducted; (3) effects on the international balance
of payments; and (4) effects on civilian technological progress.
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Each of these is now considered in turt.
6
The Economic Nature of Military Goods. Military goods are those
products purchased by the military which are to some degree special-
ized to military use. Thus, tanks, rifles, bombs, fighter planes,
etc. are military goods, while milk, meat, detergents, etc. purchased
by the armed forces are not.
Military goods so defined are peculiar in that they neither con-
tribute to the present standard of living (as do consumer goods,
housing, health care, etc.) nor to the economy's capacity to produce
and distribute "standard of fling' goods and services in the future
(as do industrial machinery, trucks, warehouses, factories, school
buildings, etc.). That is not to say military goods are useless, but
merely that they do not augment the present or future standard of
living in the way that the various consumer goods, producer goods and
social services do, and thus do not possess the same kind of economic
usefulness. However, despite the fact that they do not produce eco-
nomic value in the above sense, they do require valuable economic re-
sources for their production, and therefore impose a real cost on
society. This cost is best measured not purely in terms of money,
but rather in terms of the sacrifice of the economically useful social
and economic goods and services that could have been produced with the
labor, materials, energy, machinery, etc. which were instead devoted
to military production.
Because the money paid out to the producers of military goods
does not call forth a corresponding production of goods and services
which can be purchased by business firms and consumers, the conditions
are created whereby there may be an excess of demand relative to sup-
ply of goods. If this occurs, it will produce pressure toward a rise
in the general level of prices, i.e. inflation. This potential con-
tribution to inflation is the easiest part of the military spending
problem to handle for two reasons: (1) it is only a serious problem
when employment is full or near full; and (2) it can be offset, say
by raising taxes sufficiently to remove enough money from the rest of
the public to balance the flow of funds being spent on military goods.
However, during periods of full employment, the money flows for the
military have not been fully offset, and so have contributed to pro-
ducing inflation. For example, during nearly all of the latter part
of the decade of the 1960's, when the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam
War was intensifying, the unemployment rate was under 4%.7 Military
spending was not offset, agd between 1965 and 1969, the rate of in-
flation more than tripled.
Military Procurement Practices. Whatever the payment formula for-
Mally written into major defense procurement contracts, they have all
in practice been what are known as 'cost plus' contracts.9 These are
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contracts in which the producing firm is paid an amount equal to its
total cost of production (whatever that eventually turns out to be)
plus a profit. Operating under such a system, the firm involved not
only has no risk, but also has no incentive to hold its costs down.
To the extent that the firm wants to increase its sales revenue, it
will have a very powerful incentive to run its costs up in order to
achieve the highest possible payment for its product. U
Combining this incentive system with the very large amounts of
money made available for military procurement year after year by the
Congress has created a situation in which military industry has bid
up the prices of key resources. Chief among these are engineering
and scientific personnel, and some grades of highly skilled produc-
tion labor. Aside from its direct effects in increasing the cost of
these resources to civilian industry thus adding to the pressure to-
ward inflation, the purchasing power of defense firms, backed by
their rich customer (the Federal Government), has completely pre-
empted a substantial amount of some of these resources, with serious
long term effects on the health of the civilian economy.
For example, by one crude and conservative estimate nearly one-
third of all the engineers and scientists ii the United States were
engaged in defense-related work as of 1967.1 Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury Murray Weidenbaum had earlier put the figure at
52%.12 The pre-emption by the military of such a large fraction of
what we will subsequently see is a critical resource in a modern in-
dustrial society, cannot fail to have significant effects on the
functioning of that part of the economy that produces goods and ser-
vices which do contribute to the standard of living and the quality
of life.
International Balance of Payment Effects. From 1893 through 1970,
year by year the U.S. had a balance of trade surplus, i.e. the U.S.
exported a greater value of goods and services than it imported.
Since exports bring foreign currency into the U.S., while imports
send U.S. dollars abroad, if this had been the only aspect of the
U.S.' international transactions, there would have been a considerable
accumulation of foreign currencies (or gold) in the U.S., and a com-
parative shortage of U.S. dollars abroad. Consequently the U.S. dol-
lar would have been one of the strongest (if not the strongest) cur-
rencies in the world. However, the balance of payments includes not
only money flows related to trade, but alother international money
flows as well, and the U.S. balance of payments has been in contin-
uous deficit for many years.
What role has U.S. military expenditure played in this situation?
It has affected the U.S. international economic position directly
through outflows of U.S. dollars for defense expenditures abroad, and
indirectly through its effects on the balance of trade, chiefly via
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its influence on the competitiveness of U.S. civilian industries in
foreign and domestic markets.
In the table below are presented some basic U.S. Department of
Commerce data which bear on the direct effects of military expendi-
tures abroad and on the U.S. international financial situation. We
note that the entire cumulative balance of payments deficit for the
period 1960-1970 (inclusive) was $35 billion, whereas over the same
period total direct defense expenditures (net after military sales
abroadl were more than $30 billion. Hence, U.S. military expendi-
tures abroad accounted for 86.61 of the entire U.S. balance of pay-
ments deficit during that period.
During the years 1955-1970 (inclusive) there was a huge inflow
of foreign currencies into the U.S., represented by a cumulative
balance of trade surplus of nearly $62 billion. But during those
same years, net military expenditures abroad were responsible for an
outflow of dollars from the U.S. amounting to more than $43 billion.
The outflow of U.S. currency owing to military spending abroad thus
wiped out 69.9X of the balance of trade surplus, 1955-1970.
Perhaps an even more striking fact is that total net direct
defense expenditures abroad over the entire 20 year period from 1955
to 1974 were more than 10% greater than the total balance of trade
surplus.
These comparisons greatly understate the magnitude of U.S. de-
fense expenditures abroad, because they do not include outright U.S.
grants of military goods and services. Since they involve no inter-
national flows of currency, these gifts of military equipment and
services are not involved in the balance of money flows. However if
included, the total of almost $34 billion worth of such grants re-
corded during the years 1960-1974 would increase the military expen-
diture figures given for that period by more than 80%.1B
It is clear from these data that direct outflows of dollars In
the form of U.S. military expenditures abroad played a major role in
destroying the favorable balance of trade surplus, and contributed
to the severe weakening of the U.S. dollar. This substantially
raised the price of imported goods (including oil) upon which the
nation's business and consumers have become increasingly dependent in
the past few years. This massive outflow of military spending abroad
has directly and substantially contributed to the generation of in-
flation within the domestic U.S. economy.
Milita Expenditure and Civilian Technological Progress.
Technological progress is one of the cornerstones or modern in-
dustrial society. It is often seen as a kind of unidirectional force,
which presses onward, almost with its own imperative, compelling
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U.S. Military Exoenditures Abroad and
Balance of Payments
the International
Balance of
Payments 3
($millions)
-3,667
-2,252
-2,864
-2 713
-2,696
-2,478
-2,151
-4 683
-1,611
-6,081
-3,851
-21,965
-13 829
-7,651
-19,043
Net Direct Defense
Expenditures Abroad4($millilons)
2,501
2,627
2,466
2,835
2,503
2,752
2,596
2,449
2,304
2,133
2,122
2,935
3,226
3,143
3,328
3,354
2,893
3,621
2,316
2,159
54,263
Notes: 1. Problems of data availability and comparability complicate
a more complete analysis over the entire post World War II
period.
2. Exports-imports, merchandise, adjusted excluding military
(minus implies deficit)
3. Net liquidity balance (minus implies deficit)
4. Direct defense expenditures - military sales (does not in-
clude military grants of goods and services)
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Business Statistics (1973), pp. 13-14, and Survey of Current
Business (June 1975), pp. 26 and 30.
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Vear1
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
TOTAL
9alance
of Trade($millions)
2,897
4,753
6,271
3,462
1,148
4,892
5,571
4,521
5,224
6,801
4,951
3,817
3,800
635
607
2,603
-2,268
-6,409
955
-5,528
48,703
people to adjust themselves to the kind of world it produces.
Actually nothing could be farther from the truth. There is
nothing mystical about the development and application of new tech-
nical knowledge -- it is merely the product of individuals, trained
in the appropriate scientific and engineering disciplines, trying to
solve the problems toward which their attention is directed. Tech-
nology has no initiative of its own, nor is it unidirectional. Its
advance can be accelerated or slowed by altering the magnitude of re-
sources devoted to that purpose. It may be channeled in many dif-
ferent directions by changing the nature of the problems set before
the engineers and scientists who develop it. Technology is not a
single lane road down which we must travel at a speed beyond our
control. It is a complex interconnected network which is explored at
a pace and in a pattern largely determined by social decision, within
the limits placed upon us chiefly by the availability of appropriate-
ly trained engineering and scientific personnel.
The critical functions of civilian technological development in
a modern society are to enhance the quality of products available and
to improve the efficiency with which these products are produced.
Here the word 'products' is defined broadly to include not merely man-
ufactured goods, but rather the whole range of goods and services,
power supply, transportation etc.
As the cost of labor, fuel, raw materials, machinery and other
productive resources rise over time, they exert an upward pressure on
the cost of producing any given product, and hence on its price. The
only way this pressure can be relieved, i.e. the only way the produc-
tion cost per unit of product can be held down in the face of rising
input costs is by finding more efficient ways of utilizing these in-
puts. If, for example, an improved production technique were develop-
ed which allowed us to produce 10% more output from the same combina-
tion of inputs we had been using, we could offset up to a 10% increase
in the cost of every input by implementing this technique, and there-
fore hold production cost steady despite the rise in labor, fuel, etc.
costs. Accordingly there would be no cost pressure to raise the
product's price. Thus cost increases can be offset by increases in
the output produced per unit of input. This latter quantity is known
as productivity.
Particular attention is often focused on the rising cost of the
labor resource, and therefore on the behavior of its potential offset,
iabor productivity, Civilian technological progress plays a crucial
to-sited role In the improvement of labor productivity. On the one
hand, direct improvements in production techniques increase the out-
put obtainable from a given amount of labor. On the other hand, tech-
nological progress in the industries that produce the machinery and
equipment used in the production of all goods and services make the
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purchase of that machinery and equipment more attractive to all pro-
ducers by holding down its price (through improvements in production
techniques) and enhancing its quality. As labor prices rise, the
availability of relatively inexpensive high capability machinery will
lead producers to purchase more and better machinery, thus increasing
the output produced per worker. Therefore, both directly and in-
directly civilian technological development plays a vital role in
maintaining the economy's ability to offset higher labor (and other
resource) costs, and removing the "cost-push" pressures toward infla-
tion.
We have noted that between one-third and one-half of the engi-
neering and scientific personnel in the U.S. have been directing
their attention to the development of technology oriented to military
uses. The magnitude of this diversion is even greater than these
quantitative estimates Indicate, since the combination of high pres-
tige and high pay associated with military-related work have tended to
attract the top-ranking graduates in the various disciplines into this
area. The pre-emption of such a large portion of the nation's tech-
nological talent by the military cannot fail to have a strong adverse
impact on the rate of civilian technological development.
The argument is often made that the technology developed in the
pursuit of military oriented goals can also be applied to civilian
purposes. To be sure there is some occasional "spillover". But what
is found is strongly conditioned by what is sought. Advances in ci-
vilian technology, whether they be improved techniques of power gener-
ation or food preservation, will typically be found faster and at a
much reduced expense if they are pursued directly. Furthermore, to
the limited extent spillover exists between military and ci ylian
technological developments, it operates in both directions.'" At any
rate the acid test of the high spillover argument is essentially an
empirical one: if it is true, then the pre-emption of technological
resources should not have substantially diminished the rate of civil-
ian technological progress.
By early 1976, the indications of decline in U.S. civilian tech-
nological development were so manifest that they could no longer be
ignored by either business people or the science establishment. The
February 16, 1976 issue of Business Week carried an article entitled
"The Breakdown of U.S. Innovationw, the introduction of which includ-
ed the following, '...from boardroom to research lab, there is a
growing sense that something has happened to American innovation..
the country's genius for invention is not what it used to be." 15 The
following month, the release to Congress of the seventh annual report
of the National Science Board, the governing body of the National
Science Foundation, was reported in the New York Times under the head-
line "U.S. Science Lead is Found Eroding". The news account began,
"The international predominance of the United States in science and
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technology has suffered erosion in the past 15 years...l
6
Several years earlier, a special report in Business Week de-
tailed the increasing difficulties being encountered by industry
after industry in the U.S. as a result of the decline of U.S. civil-
ian technological progress. U.S. heavy machinery builders were run-
ning into fierce foreign competition on price and design as early as
the early 1960's. U.S. companies increasingly licensed the rights
to European developed technology in such high technology industries
as chemicals and electrical equipment. In shipbuilding and electri-
cal power transmission, American firms adopted improved methods de-
veloped by Swedish firms. In steel manufacture and in construction,
U.S. industry lagged behind Japanesy and European industry in the
application of improved techniques. 7
The economic and social effects of this civilian technological
retardation are very serious. Since civilian-oriented technological
progress is a key element in the productivity process, which is in
turn critical to the economy's cost-offsetting capability, the slowing
of that progress directly implies that rises in the costs of labor,
fuels, materials, etc. will increasingly result in higher production
costs for a whole range of products. In the case of goods and ser-
vices produced by private enterprise, these production cost increases
must evegtually be passed along to consumers in the form of higher
prices.1o  In the case of governmentally provided transportation,
health care, educational and other social services, taxes will have
to be increased to pay for increased costs, direct charges that may
in some cases be levied on users of these services to cover a portion
of their cost will have to be raised, and/or services will have to be
curtailed.
Publicly provided or subsidized social services, which would not
normally be expected to experience substantial cost-offsetting tech-
nological progress in the absence of this military diversion of tech-
nologists, e.g. education, suffer considerable cost-push inflationary
pressures as a direct result of the retardation of civilian technolo-
gical progress elsewhere. The cost of every material input they re-
quire, will be rising because of the failure of technological advance
in the industries which produce those inputs.
The failure of the cost offsetting mechanism implied by the mili-
tary's pre-emption of a large share of the nation's engineers and
scientists thus clearly leads to a substantial and ongoing inflation.
But, at the same time, it also plays a major role in generating un-
employment. On the one hand, the rising costs of publicly provided
economic and social services may persuade or compel state and local
governments to curtail these services because of the real or perceived
Intolerance of their constituents for tax increases sufficient to
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maintain them. This directly results in the loss of jobs by those
individuals who were formerly engaged in providing these services.
The rising prices of domestic private producers of goods and
services make their products less and less competitive in both for-
eign and domestic markets, especially relative to those foreign pro-
ducers in nations which continue to place sustained emphasis on the
development of civilian-oriented technical knowledge. The relative
loss of markets by domestic producers to foreign firms, both in the
U.S. and abroad, results in cutbacks in domestic production which in
turn generate unemployment even in the face of relatively high pro-
duct demand. Hence extraordinary situations of simultaneously high
demand and rising unemployment can develop, such as the existence, in
July 1971, of 16, unemployment in Detroit (and near 10% in Michigan
as a whole) during the best auto sales year in the nation's history
to that date. 19
The loss of foreign markets by U.S. producers shows up as a de-
cline in exports, the loss of domestic markets as an increase in im-
ports. But falling exports and rising imports result in a deteriora-
tion of the balance of trade. So it was in 1971 that the balance of
trade finally turned against the United States, after more than three-
quarters of a century of continuous annual surplus. Clearly this fur-
ther aggravated the balance of payments deficit, weakened the dollar
and hence constituted yet another indirect contribution of the mili-
tary to inflation.
Faced with a progressive inability to offset high resource costs,
particularly that of labor, U.S. business firms began moving their
operations to areas in which labor costs were much lower than in the
U.S. This substantially aggravated the nation's unemployment problem.
A few of the numerous examples of this "export" of jobs from the U.S.
are the loss of 2000 machinists' jobs in Utica, New York as a conse-
quence of General Electric's transfer of its operations to Singapore
between 1966 and 1972; General Instrument's closing of plants in
Massachusetts and Rhode Island and subsequent hiring of more than
7000 workers in Taiwan; and the complete transfer of all of its con-
sumer electronic components manufacturing operations overseas by
Westi nghouse. 0
Thus, for a number of reasons the decline in civilian technolo-
gical progress resulting from the relative concentration of U.S. tech-
nological talent on military research is perhaps the most important
of the severe inflation and unemployment generating effects of the
past three decades of persistently high military expenditure. It has
resulted not merely from the gross military pre-emption of engineers
and scientists, but also from the feedback effect that pre-emption has
had on engineering and scientific education in the United States.
This feedback has to some extent affected even those technologists who
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have opted for civilian-oriented research.
Social Welfare Implications of the Economic Effects of Military
Spending. To the extent that an individual's income rises at least
as fast as the price level, that individual will be partly protec-
ted again§l the erosion of his or her ability to purchase goods and
services. Hence, that person should be able to maintain or improve
that part of his or her material standard of living that is related
to the direct acquisition of those products in the market place. How-
ever, any individual whose income is not keeping pace with the infla-
tion will experience a lessened ability to buy goods and services and
thus a reduced standard of living. Those living on essentially fixed
incomes will suffer the most severe decline.
For various reasons, the people whose incomes rise the most slow-
ly or are totally fixed, tend to be those lowest on the economic lad-
der to begin with, e.g. the elderly, the chronically unemployed, the
unskilled. And for such individuals, the loss of purchasing power re-
sulting from inflation is not merely a source of inconvenience or dis-
comfort, but of real deprivation.
The inflation-related rise in the cost of state and local public
services, such as fire and police protection, education, mass trans-
portation, health care, etc. particularly in the presence of continued
diversion of the lion's share of discretionary Federal funds to mili-
tary programs, must lead to higher taxes and/or increasingly severe
cutbacks in services provided. Curtailments in such essential ser-
vices diminish everyone's well-being both in the short and long run.
The economically underprivileged, because they lack alternatives,
tend to be the most dependent on publicly provided services as well as
direct public support. They are most severely burdened by state and
local governmental cutbacks. Those in the economically middle class
undergo a two-sided squeeze, bearing a large part of the growing tax
burden required to cover the rising costs of state and local services,
while not being sufficiently wealthy to protect themselves against at
least some of the service cutbacks without real sacrifice (say by re-
moving their children from deteriorating public schools and placing
them in high quality private schools). Even higher income individuals
suffer as a result of reduced police and fire protection.
As to unemployment, the economic damage caused by sustained high
military spending is again disproportionately borne by those least
able to economically cope with it. Low income workers are in that
status partly because of a lack of skills, partly because of various
types of ethnic discrimination, and partly because they are either
unorganized or organized into relatively weak unions. They are nor-
mally considered the most marginal laborers, and are accordingly the
first to be laid off as production is reduced in response to lowered
sales.
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Another very important social effect which has developed as a
result of the unemployment effects of prolonged military emphasis is
the potential for reversal of the labor force gains made by some
ethnic minority groups and women during the past decade. The wide-
spread, nearly pervasive practice of laying off those workers with
least seniority first has put at greater risk all those who have
made recent penetration into employment areas formerly closed to them.
Unemployment always diminishes not only the economic and social
welfare of those who are unemployed, but also of society in general.
It represents a failure to develop and fully utilize labor, and as
such implies the sacrifice of a part of the potential contribution
to economic and social wellbeing of which that resource is capable.
Ongoing excessive inflation, high unemployment, rising taxes,
curtailment of basic and essential state and local government ser-
vices, a continuing deterioration of a substantial part of the na-
tion's economic and social infrastructure -- these are the legacy of
thirty years of excessive military expenditure. Far from being econom-
ically beneficial, high defense spending has been a cancer on the econ-
omy and on the society. And like a cancer, the damage it does will
compound as long as we permit it to persist.
The Nature of the Conversion Problem
It is perfectly possible to return the economy to its previous
civilian orientation without producing severe economic and social
dislocations during the period of transition. But there are real
economic, political and social obstacles to overcome. The nature of
the distortions produced in the economy by the long term emphasis on
military expenditure are such as to require structural intervention
to correct. Simple macro-economic policies like manipulating the
money supply, cutting taxes, offering investment tax breaks to bus-
iness, etc. may be helpful, but they cannot conceivably come near
being sufficient to produce a smooth transition. We will see why, as
we consider, in turn, some of the major components of the conversion
problem.
The Conversion of Engineers and Scientists. Since so much of the eco-
nomic damage inflicted by high military spending has resulted from Its
adverse effects on civilian technological progress, the successful
conversion of engineers and scientists from military-related to civil-
lan-oriented research is especially critical to rebuilding the nation's
economic strength. Since society has an enormous investment in the
training of these individuals, it would be extraordinarily wasteful to
merely find any sort of civilian job for them. For both these rea-
sons, we will assume that the conversion process is required to pro-
vide these engineers and scientists with the kind of civilian work
which utilizes their skills.
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A very important part of the problem of converting technolo-
gists to civilian research is rooted in the differences between re-
quirements for successful military and civilian technological develop-
ment. Present day high technology military products are extremely
complex, and are designed with an effort to squeeze every possible
ounce of performance out of the product. Whether or not this extra
performance capability actually has military significance, the pre-
sumption that it does c arly underlies the practice of weapons re-
search and development. This has led to the assignment of large
teams of technologists to the design of weapons systems, each, in
effect, developing and designing a part of a part. Accordingly, the
need to become expert in a very narrow range of knowledge has led to
extreme specialization of engineers and scientists engaged in mili-
tary-related work. In addition, the extreme priority attached to
military funding, combined with the common practice of procuring wea-
pons on an effectively cost-plus basis and the pressure for even small
increments in weapons capability, has led to a virtually complete de-
emphasis on the cost implications of design. In fact, more expensive
designs will certainly result in increases in sales revenue and typi-
cally in profit as well to the firms which generate them.
Successful design for the civilian market place, on the other
hand, requires very heavy emphasis on the implications of the speci-
fic design for the cost of producing the ultimate product. This im-
plies that designers, rather than being extremely specialized, should
have a fairly clear concept of the overall design of the product and
the interactions of its subcomponents. This, together with a basic
understanding of the effects on cost of modifying the design in one
way or another, will enable them to trade off changes in one part of
the design against changes in the other to achieve desired product
performance at the lowest possible cost. Keeping production cost down
enables the price to be kept at a level which will make the product
attractive to potential customers, and hence bring expanded sales and
profit to the firm.
Because of these differences, engineers and scientists performing
defense work must be retrained and re-oriented before they can be
successful in civilian research and development. They do not need to
be completely retrained because much of what they already know is al-
so required for civilian work. But their overspecialization needs to
be undone and they must be sensitized to the cost issue, and thus put
in touch with civilian design realities.
The conversion process must also be extended to the educational
institutions responsible for the training of engineers and scientists.
These institutions have, altered their curricula to emphasize spe-
cialization, especially in areas and sub-areas of interest to the mil-
itary, and strongly de-emphasize training in cost-related matters.
Instruction in mundane civilian-oriented areas like, for example,
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power engineering was curtailed or eliminated, particularly at the
'best' schools. All this was an appropriate institutional response
to the changing shape of the high-pay/high-prestige opportunities
available to their graduates. And yet, these changes meant that
even those engineers and scientists who did go directly into civilian
areas were to some extent less than optimally trained for the develop-
ment of civilian-oriented technological progress. Therefore, this
response served only to exacerbate the deterioration of U.S. civilian
technology and thus the nation's economic problems.
The inability of military-oriented engineers and scientists to
move into civilian-oriented research and development without con-
version retraining is indicated by the commonly observed tendency of
technologists, laid off because of the termination of a defense con-
tract, to either move to another geographic area in which defense
firms have just received new contracts, take jobs which do not in-
volve engineering and scientific work or simply remain unemployed un-
til the contracts return. This tendency has been read by some as an
indication that civilian technology is not starved by the diversion
of engineers and scientists to military areas as we have argued, since
they are not 'grabbed up* by cilian industrial research programs
when they do become unemployed. But, that the failure of these tech-
nologists to be readily absorbed into civilian industry is due to the
inappropriateness of their training and not an overall lack of demand
is illustrated, for example, by the development of a critical short-
age of enginprs qualified to design new power plants reported in the
early 1970's", side by side with the existence of an unemployed pool
of military-oriented engineers.
Management Conversion. The management of military industrial firms
operate in a very different atmosphere from that which prevails in
civilian-oriented enterprise. Defense firms have, in practice, only
one customer -- the United States Government. They cannot sell their
products to civilian customers in any case, and can sell to foreign
governments only with ge direct and specific approval of the U.S.
Department of Defense. Even so, weapons sold to foreign governments
were originally designed, developed, and produced for sale to the U.S.
Government.
The one-customer orientation produces a very different sales and
marketing situation from that faced by civilian firms. Rather than
knowing how to run an effective electronic and print media advertis-
Ing campaign, how to survey markets for public acceptance of a new
product line, how to price a product for penetration into new mar-
kets or expansion of existing ones, etc., it becomes critical to know
the minute detail of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations, to
develop good working relationships with key government procurement per-
sonnel, and to be able to lobby effectively with members of the Con-
gress,
-580-
Anothe-r critical difference is that the single customer does not
itself tave to sell its product in a market place. it does not there-
fore have to worry eith_r about the effects on the ultimate price of
its "product* of paying too much for the goods it buys, or the danger
of its being forced into loss or bankruptcy by a drop in its sales if
the equipment it purchases does not perform well.
"his strongly interacts with a third critical factor, the ex-
tremely high priority accorded to defense procurement, currently sup-
ported by at least national public acquiescence, if not implicit con-
sensus. This not only assures that the Lefense Department will con-
tirnue to be a very rich customer, but also that its purchase decisions
will be readily validated by both the ConE-ress and the I-resident.
Thus, thne wealthy customer that military industry services faces no
economic market test, and only the very loosest political constraints.
-he net effect of these last two factors has been to guarantee
at least higher revenues and typically higher profits to those mili-
tary firms which are most effective in running up the cost of the
oroducts which they are contracted to produce, often regardless of
whether or not these products perform as they were supposed to. A
management operating in such milieu will become very effective at find-
ing ways of producing at high cost. But this sort of management train-
Ing and experience is completely inappropriate to successful operation
in civilian markets, where holding costs down, is the crucial skill.
Cne of the most striking examples of the contrast between the way
in which products get produced for militarY as opposed to civilian
markets lies in the comparison of the Boeing 747 and the Lockheed C5A
carro plane. Both of these are jumbo jets of roughly comparable size,
but the former was designed and produced for sale to the airlines and
the latter for sale to the Air Force. The 747 is a smooth flying,
hizhly reliable aircraft flown daily by nearly every majcr airline in
the world, and is as energy efficient when fully loaded as a Volks-
wagon beetle carrying only its driver. -he C4A has been plajued by
severe operating difficulties including cracking of the wing pylons,
crash-producing failures of the rear cargo door, and considerable
landing gear problems. The Air Force has acknowledge-thatg cargo ver-
sion of the 747 could carry a larger payload than the C5A.11 In 1971,
the 747 sold at about 23 million per plane, the C5A about jLO mil-,
lion per plane. -urthermore, wing defects on the CfA which reduced'2
Its estimated service life by more than 70, were projected to cost
1.3 billion repair, nearly doubling the original cost estimates for
the program.-]
That managements of military firms are rewarded for high cost,
despite low product quality and poor performance, is illustrated by
the following listing of article headlines excerpted from the New York
Times:
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(l) "Nine Spy Planes Lost in Crashes, Pentagon Says" (March 23,
1970) -- these planes were developed by Lockheed.
(2) IX Factor Continues to Raise Luftwaffe's Starfighter Toll'
(July 4, 1972) -- report of the 154th crash of this plane,
designed by Lockheed.
(3) "Lockheed's Step Is Costliest Ever: $800 Million Write-Off
on Tristar..." (November 23, 1974) -- report of loss by
Lockheed in its development of the L1011 commercial jet.
(4) "Lockheed Says $22 Million Went to Officials Abroad"
(August 2, 1975) -- payments to foreign officials and
political organizations to obtain weapons contracts.
(5) "C5A Jet Repairs to Cost 1.5 Billion" (December 5, 1975)
(6) 'Lockheed Rises to Top as Defense Contractor" (December 11,
1975).
All this involves the same defense firm that was given a $250 million
loan guarantee by the Federal Government.
Nowhere but in military industry could a management avoid finan-
cial disaster, much less achieve ascendancy, by performing so poorly,
for so long. Clearly, one cannot expect managers accustomed to oper-
ating in a situation in which there is no risk, high costs are not
merely tolerated but become the path to success, and only one rich
customer need be serviced, to operate successfully in risky, cost
sensitive, multicustomer civilian markets without substantial retrain-
ing and re-orientation. When unconverted military industrial manage-
ments have turned their attention to production of civilian products
for state and local governments, the results have borne a striking
resemblance to their military operations in both cost and performance.
Consider, for example, the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system in
San Francisco whose prime contractor was the Rohr Company, a firm
which made its reputation in aerospace and related operations. Al-
though the system was supposj to be in operation by 1968, prototypes
were still crashing in 1971."' A few weeks after it opened in 1972,
the computer-controlled network experienced a number of breakdowns,
including one instance in which a train "failed to slow down at the
end of the line, barreled through a sand barrier, and did a nosedive
into a parking lot. "31 As of late 1975, up to half the cars were out
of service at any given time, 'causing delays and standing room only
for San Frncisco commuters, who have dubbed it Bay Area Reckless
Transit. " By 1971, estimates for he cost of the system had grown
from $792 million to $1.4 billion.35
There is little question, that whether military oriented manage-
ments are turned to the supervision of the production of goods and
services sold in the civilian market place or for civilian use by
government, they must be retrained and re-oriented as a prerequisite
for successful conversion.
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Conversion of Production and Low-Level Administrative Workers.
With the possible exception of a few highly skilled workers, the
primary problem in channeling production and administrative workers
into civilian oriented work lies not in the need for re-education,
but rather in the numbers of people involved. By 1971, at least
six million people in the United States were directly employed in
military-related work -- 3.8 million by th Pentagon, and another
2.2 million by military-oriented industry. Clearly, the bulk of
these employees are production workers and low level administrative
employees, including clerical workers.
Re-orientation to the standards of work of civilian enterprises
will undoubtedly be required, and it is possible that additional voca-
tional training will be required for some of these employees. This
latter training is not so much to undo the effects of having been em-
ployed in military-related work as such (as in the case of engineers,
scientists and managers), but rather to bring their skills into more
perfect congruence with the best civilian opportunities available.
The transition problem is simpler here because of the less involved
nature of the re-education required, but more difficult because many
more people are potentially involved.
The fact that many of the workers involved in defense production
are unionized also presents a barrier to conversion, to the extent that
the leaders of these unions take an inordinately short term and paro-
chial view. The problem is that the civilian re-employment of the
workers displaced by cutbacks in military expenditures may involve
their transfer into industries or lines of work in the jurisdiction
of unions other than those to which they currently belong. Because
this tends to reduce the membership of defense industry related unions
to the extent that it occurs, the leaders of these unions have an in-
centive to oppose this transfer and thus potentially the entire eco-
nomic conversion process, pressing instead for continued high military
spending. Such a position tends to be attractive to the membership
of these defense unions, since it appears to be in their direct, short
term interest. But, as we have seen, continued high military expendi-
ture is economically destructive, and in the longer term its inflation
and unemployment-generating effects hurt defense workers as well as
the large numbers of nondefense workers who constitute the vast major-
Ity of the U.S. labor force. It is therefore only in the most, nar-
row, nearsighted and parochial sense that any union membership bene-
fits from the continuation of high defense spending.
Capital Equipment and Facilities. Some of the industrial equipment
and facilities currently employed in the service of the military are
sufficiently general purpose in nature to be directly usable in civil-
ian-oriented work. But some, such as certain types of extremely high
Capability machine tools, specialized shipbuilding facilities and
military bases are not so directly transferable. To the extent that
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some of this machinery suffers primarily-from the excessive cost re-
lated with its excessively high performance capability, the equipment
should be usable for civilian operations if some sort of special
write-offs or tax breaks are allowed to overcome the cost penalty.
Those industrial facilities which do not so much possess excess
capabilities as the wrong capabilities will have to be reconstructed,
but that cannot be effectively done until specific plans have been
developed for the particular alternative purpose to which those facil-
ities are to be turned. Similarly, military bases are unlikely to be
appropriate, without some degree of alteration, for efficient perform-
ance of a civilian oriented activity.
Intra-Reaional Concentration and the Conversion Problem. Military
bases and the facilities of military-industrial firms are not spread
evenly throughout the United States, but are rather concentrated in
certain areas within the various regions of the country. Every ma-
jor section of the country contains some geographically small pockets
of major military or military-industrial employment. Examples include
the San Francisco Bay area, parts of Long Island, Seattle, and the
Boston-Cambridge area. This combination of high concentration and
geographic dispersion has important political and economic implications.
Politically, one would be hard-pressed to devise a geographic
pattern which would provide better leverage. The Congressional repre-
sentatives elected by constituencies which include one or more of
these pockets, feel themselves compelled to support military programs
that they perceive are in the interest of the people by whom they were
elected, providing them with continued employment. They come to be-
lieve, that their continued election depends upon the effectiveness
with which they can aid in at least maintaining, if not expanding the
flow of military funds to their district. Accordingly, they may be-
come salespeople for the military industry in their area.
Through the usual type of legislative agreements, the support of
these legislators from various key areas for various military programs
becomes multiplied into broad Congressional support for the funding of
virtually any program the military can put forth. Legislators who do
not go along can be punished by merely withdrawing military funds from
their areas (e.g. by closing bases, cancelling contracts), or switch-
ing promised new funding to other regions. In the absence of prior
serious conversion planning, this kind of 'cold turkey' cutoff of
funding will produce real economic difficulties and this is not con-
ducive to re-election.
The primary economic implication of the geographic pattern of
military-related facilities is that macroeconomic policies such as in-
come tax reductions and money supply increases cannot cope with the
problem of stimulating the economy so as to effectively produce a
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smooth absorption of the resources freed -from military use into civil-
ian activities. Such policies average their effects broadly over the
nation. But what is required here are policies which will reach spe-
cifically into these pockets of military concentration and redevelop
them. Only in this way can the temporary economic dislocation which
accompanies any major structural change be held to a minimum, and the
economic reconstruction of the United States thus accomplished with-
out real hardship.
Policies for Successful Conversion
An economically and socially successful conversion process re-
quires considerable planning and preparation. First, a careful anal-
ysis must be performed to identify appropriate civilian alternatives
into which the resources released from military-related activities
may be effectively channeled. Second, a program for efficiently pre-
paring the resources for their new civilian-oriented functions must
be carefully developed. Finally, in the case of the human resources
involved, various social services must be provided during the period
of transition including income maintenance, employment services, and
relocation and educational assistance where required. We shall con-
sider each of these problems in turn.
Civilian Alternative for Military-Related Resources. In a broad
policy sense, it is not at all difficult to identify economically and
socially productive alternatives for the employment of resources now
devoted to unproductive military use. One need only consider those
vital social services and important areas of the economic infrastruc-
ture that are either presently in an advanced state of decline or
clearly undergoing serious progressive retrenchment. Urban mass
transit, housing, intercity rail transportation, police and fire ser-
vices, mental and physical health care, standard education and voca-
tional training, special education, care for the elderly, day care,
etc. all would benefit enormously from a transfusion of resources
from military programs, and that would clearly produce a major in-
crease in the nation's economic and social welfare.
It is possible to get a very rough but concrete idea of the kinds
of tradeoffs which exist between military and civilian programs by
comparing the funding requirements for a series of specific a~erna-
tives. A list of a dozen such tradeoffs is presented below:
(1) Impounded federal housing funds, 1972 = $130 million =
8 F-14 aircraft
(2) Vetoed EPA plan to de-pollute the Great Lakes = $141 million
= 1 B-1 bomber plus 1 DD963 destroyer
(3) National solid waste treatment program = $43.5 billion = B-1
bomber program
(4) Unfunded program to upgrade rural American life = $300 million
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= 5 C5A aircraft
(5) Child nutrition programs funding cut = $69 million 2
DE-1052 destroyer escorts
(6) To brina all Americans above the poverty line, 1971 = $11.4
billion = B-l bomber program, low estimate
(7) To eliminate hunger in America = $4-5 billion = C5A aircraft
program
(8) Philadelphia 1971 schools deficit = $40 million = 2 F-14
aircraft plus 2 Main Battle Tanks
(9) Graduate fellowships funding cut, 1973 = $175 million = 1
nuclear attack submarine
(10) 1973 cities' needs to rebuild blighted areas = $3 billion = 1
nuclear aircraft carrier, equipped, and escorts.
(11) 1972-73 cut in federal mental health budgets = $65 million =
1 C5A aircraft plus 5 Huey helicopters
(12) Construction of a 584 bed general hospital in San Francisco =
$41 million = 1 B-1 bomber
Besides such directly socially conscious alternatives, general re-
direction of resources into the production of "standard of living'
goods and services, from machine tools to bubble gum, would revitalize
the civilian economy. This revitalization would play a major role in
creating the conditions under which the goal of full employment with-
out significant inflation becomes economically achievable. And major
gains in social welfare would clearly follow this kind of economic re-
development.
But while broad prescriptions are important from the viewpoint of
policy and perspective, an effective conversion process requires the
detailed specification of particular alternatives for each facility,
and each area undergoing this transformation. Let us assume that we
are focusing on the development of specific civilian alternatives for
a particular industrial facility or military base complex. What do
we do?
The first step is to analyze the nature and quantity of all the
productive resources involved in the transformation: the types and
numbers of machines and their capabilities, the sorts of buildings
(including their layout), the skill and experience mix of the labor
force, and the characteristics of the site, including its size, ter-
rain and location. The second step is lay out a list of alternatives
whose requirements for productive resources most closely correspond
with what is currently available, as indicated by the resource anal-
ysis of the first step. Seeking alternatives which best match the
capabilities of the present mix of resources minimizes dislocation
and disruption by reducing the need for labor force hiring, firing,
and retraining, and new equipment purchases. This tends to minimize
the social cost of transition, as well as its direct financial cost.
Furthermore, playing to the strengths of existing capabilities also
increases the probability of success in the new activities. To some
extent, the initial resource analysis will in itself, suggest at least
broad classes of feasible alternatives. For example, a manufacturing
firm which owns considerable metalworking equipment and employs a fair
amount of machinists would be more likely to convert successfully to
the manufacture of metal office furniture or railroad cars than to
the production of detergents or cosmetics.
We should not conceive of this list of alternatives in purely in-
dustrial terms. Public and private nonmanufacturing projects, in
areas such as pollution control, education, transportation, etc. are
also major alternative productive uses of resources. For example, it
may well be that the prime civilian-oriented use for a particular
naval facility may be as a major sewage treatment complex, medical cen-
ter, or new university campus, rather than as an industrial park. It
would be a serious mistake to think too narrowly at this critical stage
of developing alternatives.
Finally, the 'success potential' of each of the alternatives
should be evaluated. In the case of conversion of industrial facili-
ties to civilian production this rrimarily involves a study of what
is called the 'marketability' of the product, which involves an anal-
ysis of the demand for the product at the ranges of price that would
permit a sufficient margin of profit (after covering costs) to make
this product line attractive to the producer. In the case of public
or non-profit projects, the evaluation should involve an analysis of
the social need for such a project in that region, as well as its es-
timated cost. In either case, the accuracy and realism of estimates
of both one-time conversion costs and subsequent continuing post-con-
version production costs play a critical role in determining the
feasibility and attractiveness of any proposed alternative.
To the extent that there is less than a perfect match between the
labor requirements of even the best civilian altcrnatlves for a given
military enterprise and its pre-conversion labor force, there may be
a need to channel some of the labor force Into productive civilian
activities wholly outside of that particular enterprise. For example,
it is extremely unlikely that all, or even most, of the engineers and
scientists currently employed by military Industries would be required
for any reasonable civilian alternative activities to which these in-
dustries would turn. This is no particular problEm, in the sense that
there are many civilian activities outside these particular converted
industgies in which the services of such personnel would be of great
value.37 We need to think in terms of sufficient alternatives to pro-
ductively re-employ all of the resources (particularly labor) released
from military activity, and not simply sufficient alternatives to con-
vert present military bases and military-industrial firms Into civil-
ian facilities.
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Preparing Resources for Conversion. Conversion of the labor resource
requires different amounts and kinds of retraining and re-orientation
depending on the original function of that resource in the military-
related activity. Fersonnel employed in the development of technol-
ogy, i.e. engineers and scientists, will as has been argued, general-
ly require despecialization training in their fields, along with re-
orientation to the cost implications of their work. The specific
course work required, however, will differ somewhat depending upon
the particular new civilian direction in which any given individual
will be heading. For example, mechanical engineers who will become
involved in the development of urban mass transit systems should not
follow exactly the same program as those who will be designing home
appliances. Therefore, in order to avoid one of the most common fatal
flaws in well-intentioned occupational training programs -- training
people into areas in which insufficient employment opportunities ex-
ist -- it is necessary for planning purposes to know what civilian
employment opportunities are available. This is one of the reasons
why the analysis of civilian alternatives discussed just previously is
a key prerequisite for successful conversion.
It is important to understand that for any given individual a
specific program, built around his or her past experience and train-
ing, and tailored for entry into the area that he or she prefers
(given the available opportunities), can be developed by direct per-
sonal consultation with an educational advisor. What is needed for
general conversion planning purposes is a clear idea of how many peo-
ple from each field and level of education will be involved, and which
broad areas of opportunity will exist for absorbing them into produc-
tive civilian activity. In this way, sufficiently accurate estimates
may be made of the time, funding, and personnel requirements of this
conversion retraining to permit an effective, intelligently designed
re-education program to be developed.
The educational component of the conversion process for manage-
ment decision makers will on the whole be somewhat simpler because it
can be considerably more general. Within limits, the kind of re-orien-
tation to cost minimization and civilian type marketing, sales, etc.
functions they require will be valuable to them regardless of what
civilian activity they subsequently manage. At least insofar as for-
mal training requirements are concerned, there is a greater similar-
ity between effectively managing a paper manufacturer or computer com-
pany, than between effectively designing appliances or rail systems.
Existing business schools will probably prove competent to accom-
plish the kind of management re-orientation required. Existing engi-
neering schools, however, will themselves require some redirection be-
fore they can effectively accomplish the required re-education of
technologists. Though it might involve some trauma, there is every
reason to be confident that these institutions can make the necessary
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changes without excessive delay.
Individuals in production and lower level administrative func-
tions can most probably be given the kind of re-orientation to civil-
ian standards of performance they might require in an on-the-job sit-
uation. Formal occupational retraining will be needed only to the
extent that the best civilian alternatives available to them in the
economy at the point of conversion require somewhat different skills
from those which they currently possess. It is undoubtedly a good
idea, to provide some vocational retraining programs for such indi-
viduals, but it is unlikely that these will need to be anywhere near
as intensive or extensive as the programs for engineers, scientists
and managers. Even so, clear knowledge of the civilian alternatives
available is once again critical to the economic and social effec-
tiveness of retraining.
Preparing capital equipment and facilities for conversion is
primarITY a matter of assessing In detail what changes in layout,
direct equipment and facilities, and supporting equipment and facili-
ties are implied by the chosen civilian alternative. Given such an
assessment, it should not be difficult to estimate both financing re-
quirements and the time needed from start to finish for the actual
physical conversion. This will in turn enable development of a finan-
cial plan, as well as effective coordination of this phase of the re-
source conversion process with the others.
Transition Support Services. Workers undergoing occupational transi-
tlon, whether or not it is part of a process of conversion from mili-
tary to civilian economy, must find ways of connecting with new job
opportunities, getting whatever retraining is necessary, financing a
move when relocation is required, and keeping body and soul together
during the period between jobs. The burden of meeting all these needs
can be greatly eased by the availability of appropriate social ser-
vices.
Not all of the workers involved in the conversion process will
be changing employers, and those who will not do not have to worry
about locating new job opportunities or maintaining their income.
They may or may not require retraining, and probably will not require
relocation, but even when retraining or relocation is necessary it
should be possible to finance them at least partially through employ-
ers, though perhaps with some public supplementation.
Those individuals who must change employers will generally have
much greater need for social services. Besides direct income main-
tenance assistance, they will likely require temporary public replace-
ment of some employment fringe benefits -- in particular group medical
and dental insurance plans. An effective public program of employment
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services will be critical in making them aware of the nature arid loca-
tion of the new employment opportunities which best match their skills.
Along with counseling services, this will be of vital importance in
enabling them to plan whatever specific retraining they may need. In
addition, the employment service will facilitate the process of direct
placement of dislocated employees into new jobs. To make the transi-
tion even smoother, the government could provide special tax or other
incentives for employers to sign conditional employment contracts with
potential employees during this period that in effect guaranteed the
prospective employees a job with that organization upon successful
completion of a mutually agreed upon program of retraining. In this
way, individuals requiring retraining that could be expected to
stretch over a period of from six months to a year would have some
assurance that undertaking training into a particular area of civil-
ian expertise would provide them with attractive re-employment.
Aside from any direct government benefits, private enterprises
(whether businesses or private nonprofit institutions) would gain
from the increased certainty in planning such agreements would imply.
Operating the entire conversion process along the lines suggested
will tend to minimize the amount of geographic relocation required.
This is important because moves over extended distances tend to be
very disruptive of family and friendship ties. While people develop
social roots after living in an area for a prolonged period, their
ability to re-establish roots in a new area should not be underestimat-
ed. This is particularly true of young people, who often actively
seek a new area in which to live and grow. In fact, the general popu-
lation of the United States is normally highly geographically mobile.
For example, in 1970 more than 40% of the U.S. population lived in a
different house than that in which they lived in 1965, and nearly 45o
of this group had moved to a different county or a different nation.i-
At any rate, the high degree of geographic concentration of mili-
tary-related facilities virtually guarantees that some relocation will
be required for some individuals. This is particularly true for engi-
neers and scientists since they are concentrated within pockets of
defense industry much more highly than they would be likely to be in
any civilian-oriented industry. But, the engineers and scientists
who work in military industry have already developed a pattern of
extraordinarily high geographic mobility as a result of their occupa-
tional need to follow the shifting defense contracts. So the pros-
pect of one more move, coupled with the enhanced likelihood of future
geographic stability, should not be, for them, an overly difficult
thing with which to cope.
Expenses incurred in relocation for the purpose of re-employment
in a new area are already tax deductible as a matter of course. Sup-
plemental government relocation allowances for one time, conversion-
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connected single moves, along with aid in locating new housing,
should go far in further easing the difficulties of relocating for
those who must do so.
It is extremely important to the successful revitalization of
the U.S. economy and society that the conversion process have a de-
fined end. In order to avoid establishing new kinds of unhealthy de-
pendencies, any effective conversion process must be designed to put
itself out of business. The permanent existence of a very small ver-
sion of the machinery for easing economic transitions may be of real
value in a dynamic economy, but great care must be taken to avoid
giving birth to large, new, self-perpetuating conversion bureaucra-
cies.
Developing a Consensus for Conversion
As long as this nation remains a democracy, no process of eco-
nomic conversion requiring the broad intervention of government can
hope to be successful without the development of a political consen-
sus to support it. This was true for the conversion to a military-
oriented economy, and it is just as true for the conversion back to a
civilian economy. The present consensus supporting the continuation
of high levels of military expenditure derives primarily from two wide-
ly held beliefs, one economic and one military: (1) Military expendi-
ture is economically necessary and beneficial; (2) Expansion in the
quantity and quality of weapons systems and other components of nation-
al military forces increases national security. Both of these beliefs
are wrong, in the most straightforward sense of the word -- they are
simply at variance with the facts. It is for this reason that I be-
lieve the education of the general U.S. population to the objective
economic and military realities of the present world is a critical
pre-condition to the development of broad-scope support for the pro-
cess of economic conversion discussed here.
Attention has been focused in the present paper on the economic
side of the issue. It has been argued that the actual economic
effects of sustained high military expenditure are highly destructive,
and that these effects go far in explaining the unprecedented simul-
taneous high inflation/high unemployment which has become a fact of
life in the U.S. With respect to weapons of mass destruction, the ex-
pansion of military systems reduces the security of the nations en-
gaged in building up their forceg, because they become increasingly
endangered by their own weapons.P) There is a great need for further
exploration of both these areas of research, and perhaps even more
critically for the popularization of the arguments and evidence de-
veloped by such work.
There is neither any need nor any value in conducting the educa-
tional process required for the development of a conversion consensus
in a propagandistic fashion. I believe the clear presentation of the
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objective facts, the logical linkages between them and their implica-
tions is more than sufficient to break the power of the illusions
that have so long supported the continuation of high military expendi-
ture.
In order for this educational process to have the maximum chance
for success, it should not be completely confined to the presentation
of scholarly treatises and the writing of journal articles. It must
stimulate debate not only at conferences of academicians, but also at
political gatherings, in school classrooms, union meetings, mass media
programs, etc. Such grass roots debate is in the best traditions of
U.S. democracy, and should at the very least raise the awareness of
the public with respect to these critical issues.
It should be pointed out that the development of plans for the
conversion of military-oriented resources to civilian activities is
of considerable value even in the absence of a curtailment of military
spending. Since military contracts periodically shift from one place
to another, it would clearly be in the best interests of the workers
in defense industry to have detailed plans for turning to the produc-
tion of civilian-oriented goods and services when military contracts
are terminated or lost by their firm. In this way, they could avoid
being laid off until the defense contracts return. The availability
of such ready plans is also an advantage to society in general because
it permits some productive purpose to be served by these workers be-
tween defense contracts, and avoids the need to pay them unemployment
compensation. Thus, it would make sense for unions to support at least
conversion planning, even if they were not initially willing to sup-
port full-scale economic conversion.
As a rough estimate, the entire economic conversion process can
be expected to take from two to four years. It will involve a great
deal of detailed planning (mostly on a local basis) and careful imple-
mentation, at the cost of a considerable investment of time and effort.
However, the economic and social benefits which will accrue as a re-
sult of this investment are truly enormous. The smooth and efficient
transition to a civilian-oriented economy can be accomplished, but it
requires nothing less than a national committment to insure its rapid
and successful completion.
Footnotes
1. Full employment is defined in this waL rather than as cor-
responding to 0% unemployment in order to allow for various forms of
"frictional unemployment", including the temporary unemployment of
those in transition between jobs. These are felt to be inevitable in
a dynamic economy, and different in kind from the unemployment rep-
resented by increases in the unemployment rate beyond this base.
-5T2.-
2. Their analysis was rather casual, and their estimates were
characterized by the economists themselves as rough approximations.
See Paul A. Samuelson and Robert M. Solow, "Analytical Aspects of Anti-
Inflation Folicy", American Economic Review (!:ay 1960), p. 192.
3. Lawrence R. Klein and Ronald C. Bodkin, 'Empirical Aspects of
the Trade-Offs Among Three Goals: High Level EmDloyment, Price Sta-
bility, and Economic Growth", Inflation, Growth and Employment, A
Series of Research Studies Prepared for the Commission on Money and
Credit, Prentice Hall, 1964, p. 393.
4. Bureau of economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Survey of Current Business (March 1976), pp. S-8 and S-13.
5. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Modern Library (1937),
pp. 315 and 325-6. Smith was not writing solely of the military, but
also included the king and his court, and the "ecclesiastical estab-
lishment", among others, in his category of unproductive labor.
6. The line of economic analysis presented here is based on
that which has been developed, in considerably greater detail, by
Seymour Melman in his powerful and insightful book, The Permanent War
Economy: American Capitalism in Decline (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1974). Pieces of this analysis were presented in some of Melman's
earlier books including Our Depleted Society (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1965) and Pentagon Capitalism (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1970)
7. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Business Statistics (1973), p. 69.
8. Ibid, p. 40.
9. For example, the Air Force's C5A transport plane, which ex-
perienced a $2 billion cost overrun (i.e. excess of actual cost over
original cost estimates) was produced under a firm "fixed price" con-
tract Payment was simply adjusted upward to cover the overrun. Thus
the 'fixed price' was fixed in name only. For a fascinating and de-
tailed account of the operation of military procurement procedures in
the case of the C5A and several other major weapons systems, written
by a former Air Force Deputy for Management Systems in the Pentagon,
see A. Ernest Fitzgerald, The High Priests of Waste (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1972).
10. For a straightforward theoretical comparison of the effects
of sales maximization and profit maximization on production costs un-
der various contractual payment formulas, see Lloyd J. Dumas, 'Payment
Functions and the Productive Efficiency of Military-Industrial Firms',
Journal of Economic Issues (June 1976).
11. Footnote 11 appears at end of list.
-593-
12. U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Sub-
committee on 2mployment and Manpower, Hearings: Nation's Manpower
Revolution, Part 9 (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office,
1964), p. 3146
13. Bureau of Economic Analysis U.S. Department of Commerce,
Survey of Current Business (June 1975, p. 30.
14. Interestingly enough, at least two of the developments most
commonly cited as major examples of beneficial civilian fallout from
military-related technology programs -- Pyroceram (made by Corning
Glass Works), a material used first for missile nose cones and later
for cookware, and medical telemetry devices -- were in fact products
of long civilian technological development programs which spilled
over into military applications. (See Edwin Diamond, The Rise and
Pall of the Space Age (Garden City, New York: Doubleda7y,1T96),-pp.
64-65. ).
It is curious, however, that none of the advocates of the spill-
over benefits of military technology ever seem willing to accept the
argument, which follows directly from the same logic, that if the
transfer of technology between these two sectors is so high, we could
just as well concentrate our resources on civilian technological de-
velopment and let military technological advance proceed as a result
of spillover.
15. "The Breakdown of U.S. Innovation'. Business Week (February
16, 1976), p. 56.
16. Victor K. Mc.lheny, "U.S. Science Lead Is Found Eroding',
New York Times (March 14, 1976).
17. "Making U.S. Technology More Competitive', Business Week
(January 15, 1972).
18. In an industry in which firms were making substantial pro-
fits, the cost increases could be absorbed for a time by the firm by
its acceptance of lowered profits, though this could not be done in-
definitely. However, firms which are earning substantial profits
normally do so as a result of their possessing some degree of control
over their markets, and to the extent that they have such market
power they will be able to enforce a pass-along of costs in the form
of increased prices. Firms under severe competition, on the other
hand, will tend not to have a substantial enough profit margin to
absorb higher costs, and so will be compelled to pass them along as
higher prices. Thus in any case, over the long term higher costs
lead to higher prices.
19. New York Times, July 25, 1971.
-5911-
20. Seymour Melman, The Permanent War Economy (New York: Simon
and Shuster, ]974), pp. 99-101.
21. To be completely protected, the dollar value of all assets
owned by that person (e.g. stocks, bonds, savings accounts) would
also have to be rising at least as fast as the rate of price infla-
tion.
22. A rough estimate for the year 1967 was that the complete
termination of all defense work would have released scientists and
engineers with an aggregate total of nearly 8,000,000 person-years of
education (see Lloyd J. Dumas, op. cit. 1970, p. 313).
23. I would argue that, at least as it applies to nuclear wea-
pons and other weapons of mass destruction, many of these perform-
ance improvements not only have no direct military significance, but
actually introduce complexity which renders weapons systems less re-
liable, thus reducing national security. It is rather like designing
a device which slightly reduces the sound produced by the detonation
of a dynamite stick, at the expense of making it more likely to acci-
dentally explode in one's face.
24. See, for example, Davis B. Bobrow, 'Military Research and
Development: Implications for the Civil Sector3 , Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science (March 1973), pp.
120-121.
25. New York Times, July 27, 1972.
26. In fact, most foreign sales of arms are apparently funneled
directly through the Defense Department, which buys the weapons from
U.S. manufacturers and resells them to the foreign governments in-
volved. (See Michael C. Jensen, 'U.S. Arms Sales Are Complex', New
York Times, April 15, 1975).
27. John W. Finney, "C5A Jet Repairs to Cost 1.5 Billion", New
York Times, December 5, 1975.
28. Seymour Melman, op. cit., p. 47.
29. John W. Finney, op. cit.
30. Seymour Melman, op. cit., p. 85.
31. "BART in Transit', Newsweek, January 12, 1976.
32. Ibid.
33. New York Post, December 15, 1971.
-595-
34. Interagency Economic Adjustment Committee, Second Annual
Report to the President on Federal Assistance to Defense-impacted
Communities, (Washington: April 29, 1972).
35. It is only a rough idea because it focuses on money rather
than resources.
36. Adapted from Seymour Melman, The Permanent War Economy
(New York: Simon and Shuster, 1974), pp. 200-202.
37. In 1968, I roughly estimated that more than 95% of the
engineers and scientists who would have been released from their
place of employment even in the event of a total elimination of mili-
tary activity could have been re-employed productively in areas
such as urban renewal, teaching and transportation. (Lloyd J. Dumas,
op. cit., 1970, pp. 313-320.)
38. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
States, 1975 (Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975), p. 37.
39. Lloyd J. Dumas, "National Insecurity in the Nuclear Age',
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (May 1976).
11. For a straightforward theoretical comparison of the
effects of sales maximization and profit maximization on produc-
tion costs under various contractual payment formulas, see
Lloyd J. Dumas, "Payment Functions and the Productive Efficiency
of Military-Industrial Firms", Journal of Economic Issues (June 1976).
-596-
